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Abstract 
The paper discusses the cases of pragmatic conversions to, and out of, Islam in interwar Yugoslavia.  
It analyzes these cases in the context of Sharia law, which, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes (Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929), regulated the family affairs of the country’s Muslim 
population. Through these cases, the paper seeks to understand the complicated interaction between 
the Yugoslav state law and the Sharia, arguing that contrary to common perception, Sharia allowed for 
flexibility for those individuals who wished to move between the categories of official identity.  The 
waning influence of state law over Sharia during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the late 1930s, in 
the lead-up to the Second World War, made it easier for individuals to game the system. The 
discussion shows that despite being based on the integrationist ideology of Yugoslavism, the Yugoslav 
interwar state was straddled with an unwieldy legal system, which made the movement of individuals 
between categories extremely cumbersome. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 By the late nineteenth century conversions in Bosnia-Herzegovina had become an explosive 
issue, not only politically but also literally, as they often provoked a fury of communal unrest.  In a 
country with a legal system based on confessional segregation, dating back to the Ottoman millet 
system, where national neatly overlapped with religious boundaries, it could not have been otherwise.  
The Ottoman retreat, and the occupation by the Austro-Hungarians in 1878, upended the messy, but 
long established, political equilibrium, dislodging the dominance of the Muslims and prompting a 
vibrant but divisive political life.  In this atmosphere religious conversions became an extension of the 
political fighting, particularly between the Muslims, who saw themselves as existentially threatened 
under the Catholic Habsburgs, and the Croats, who felt greater affinity towards the regime due to their 
shared faith.  The behavior of the Sarajevo Archbishop Stadler, who openly proselytized, infuriated 
Muslims clerics who seized on every conversion as evidence of a plot by the regime-backed Catholic 
establishment to destroy Islam. 
 The explosive nature of conversions became evident in two cases that gripped the 
Herzegovinian countryside, and later the entire country, during the last two decades of the 19th 
century.  In 1881, a small village near Mostar was rocked by the news that a young Muslim woman, 
by the name of Saja Čokić, had fled her father’s home, converted to Catholicism and married her 
Catholic boyfriend.  A local mufti organized a delegation, led by the girl’s outraged father, to the local 
Austro-Hungarian officials, demanding that the girl be returned home and the conversion immediately 
annulled since she was a minor.  The mufti further argued that the whole operation had been concocted 
by the local Catholic priest and the girl’s Catholic in-laws.  The authorities were worried enough to 
summon the newlyweds to court where Saja defended her decision to convert to Catholicism, insisting 
that she had done so out of her own free will, and most remarkably, that she was not fifteen, as her 
father had claimed, but twenty-two.  It is not clear how, but the court eventually arrived at the 
“medical opinion” that the girl was indeed an adult and closed the case.  The father, however, 
continued to press the case at the district Shari’a court, which even arrested Saja for a brief period of 
time, but was then forced by state officials to release her.  Although the saga may have been traumatic 
for the girl—particularly given the possibility that she had to undergo a medical exam to determine her 
age—the controversy remained largely confined to the Mostar region and eventually petered out 
amidst a peasant rebellion which erupted in January 1882.1 
 Following this incident, the Austro-Hungarian authorities attempted to prevent another 
outbreak of communal unrest by more tightly regulating conversions, but another conversion scandal 
erupted at the turn of the century, threatening the very stability of the regime.  Because many 
conversions were followed by accusations by representatives of all communities that the clergy of the 
opposing community had been actively involved in “stealing” the convert, the authorities engaged in 
extensive negotiations with the religious representatives of all communities in drafting a conversion 
law.  The conversion statute of 1891 allowed for all concerning parties to have unfettered access to the 
convert, and mandated a waiting period for the conversion to take effect.2  Eight years later, when the 
news of Fata Omanović’s disappearance spread through another Muslim village in Herzegovina, the 
Mostar mufti gathered a delegation of over 1000 Muslims and marched on the local government 
offices, demanding government intervention.  The accusations were familiar enough: the unsuspecting 
Muslim girl had been kidnapped under the cover of night by a group of nuns, ferried to a monastery, 
converted, and married off to a Habsburg officer, all under the watchful eye of the Sarajevo 
Archbishop Stadler.  The authorities attempted to quell the unrest by arresting and exiling some of the 
Muslim leaders, but the effort backfired and within a year what had been a village based protest over 
the fate of a young woman escalated into a Bosnia-wide Muslim movement for religious autonomy.  
The Fata Omanović affair sparked numerous delegations and petitions, both to Pest and Vienna, 
                                                     
1 Robert J. Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1878-1914.  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1981), 93-98 
2 Robert J. Donia.  Sarajevo: A Biography.  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 99. 
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forcing the regime to eventually issue the Autonomy Statute in 1910, granting the Muslim community 
a wide-ranging autonomy in the management of its religious, educational, and business affairs.3  Fata 
eventually resurfaced, almost forty-years later, under the name of Darinka Prijatelj, a Slovenian living 
in Maribor, when she gave a newspaper interview in which she revealed that she had left her village 
voluntarily with the helps of nuns, worked at a Split monastery until 1910 when she married a 
Slovenian officer, converted, and moved to Maribor.4  
 It is partly due to this volatile history of conversions that the post-WWI Yugoslav state strictly 
regulated movement between official categories and effectively placed the individual citizen into a 
confessional straightjacket.  The Yugoslav Constitution adopted the 1906 Austro-Hungarian law, 
which besides regulating the identity of mixed marriage children and conversions, also mandated that 
each citizen declare one of the recognized religions as his public identity.5  Individuals who trespassed 
across the inter-confessional boundary could disappear, quite literally.  In one case, after the death of 
her husband, a retired police officer, his wife could not obtain his death certificate because his name 
had not been entered into any official record.  It turns out that Jozo Ivić, a Catholic married to an 
Orthodox woman had asked to be buried in an Orthodox graveyard, next to a grave reserved for his 
wife.  The local Orthodox priest later claimed that he had accepted to bury Jozo “out of religious 
tolerance,” but could not enter his name into Orthodox death records because Jozo had not converted.  
The Catholic priest from Jozo’s parish also refused to enter his name into Catholic records because he 
had effectively excommunicated himself by being buried in an Orthodox graveyard.  Jozo’s wife 
desperately petitioned all relevant authorities, asking for a death certificate so that she could inherit his 
meager pension.  It would take more than a year—from October 1922 to January 1924—and multiple 
interventions by the Bosnian government for a death certificate at last to be issued.6  Another example 
of the importance of religious identity in interwar Yugoslavia is the case of Helena Kopčenek, an 
American woman from Chicago who was denied the permission to marry a Muslim man from 
Trebinje, Sajto Dilić, because she did not declare her affinity with either of the recognized religions.  
Even though the Supreme Shari’a Court overturned this decision by a district court, arguing that 
Helena could marry if her witnesses could testify that she was not already married, the highest court 
still mandated that she declare herself under one of the confessional categories.  It is not clear if the 
two ever married.7   
 Although national identity was made obligatory for most Europeans after World War I8, what 
makes the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina unique is that the interaction between the Shari’a and state law 
opened up new possibilities for individuals wanting to game the system.  Despite the heavy social and 
financial costs of conversion, as religious communities had a monopoly over individual’s inheritance 
rights, there was still a substantial number of Bosnians converting for purely pragmatic purposes.  The 
federal Ministry of Faiths warned, as early as 1922, about the increasing frequency of what it called 
“speculative conversions”, mostly done for marriage or divorce purposes.9  By the late 1930s these 
conversions had become worrying even for the highest Islamic authority in Bosnia, Ulema medžlis, 
which issued a memorandum to the clergy, warning them against approving such conversions.10  
                                                     
3 The most thorough summary of the affair can be found in Donia, Islam under the Double-Eagle, 97-113. 
4 “Razgovor R. Kadića s Darinkom Prijatelj.  Fata Omanović—djevojče čiji je slučaj zatalasao Herceg-Bosnu otkriva svoju 
dramatsku tajnu.”  Jugoslovenski list, 21 VIII. 1940, p. 6.  As cited in Zoran Grijak, “Predstavka Episkopata Vrhbosanske 
Metropolije iz 1903. godine u svjetlu austrougarske vjerske politike u Bosni i Hercegovini.”  Croatica christiana 
periodica (CCP) 62 (2008): 78. 
5 Zlatko Hasanbegovic.  Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878-1945.  Doba utemeljenja.  (Zagreb: Ivo Pilar, 2007), 348. 
6 Pokrajinska Uprava, Kutija 127, Arhiv BiH. 
7 Ostavština Ajni Abdulaha Bušatlića, 230/32, 18 May 1932. 
8 Tara Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis.”  Slavic Review, Spring 2010: 
101.  Zahra argues that once the empires turned into nation-states after 1918 citizens were forcibly made by the new 
states to declare themselves as belonging to one of the nations. 
9 Hasanbegović, 357. 
10 Vrhovni Šerijatski sud u Sarajevu, 143/39. 
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Shari’a scholar Ibrahim Džananović has pointed out that during the 1930s, “fictitious” conversions to 
Islam were “especially widespread.”11  Taking advantage of the flexibility and informality of Shari’a 
marriage laws, these individuals converted to Islam in order to obtain a divorce when their own 
religious authorities would not grant it, marry a second wife over the protests of the first one, or more 
ominously, save their lives in the midst of World War II.   
 It is important to note that in their overwhelming majority these individuals were men.  
Reminding us once again that nations are imagined, articulated, and regulated by men12, women had a 
particularly difficult time in obtaining legal benefits through conversion.  As Veena Das argues in her 
seminal study of women kidnapped during the partition of India, and as the above cases of conversion 
controversies show, women’s bodies are often “a sign through which men communicated with each 
other.”13  As it will be shown, women converts to Islam were viewed with suspicion by both secular 
and religious authorities as cunning manipulators of men, as anti-state spies, or as prone to vice.  
However, despite the male dominated legal system which actively discriminated against them, women 
still found ways to punch holes through the rigid inter-confessional boundary and game the system.  
The gendered nature of conversions aside, what the following stories show is that a state that was 
officially based on the ideology of integral Yugoslavism—which strove to unify all of the different 
religions into an overarching national identity—was saddled with a clumsy and inflexible legal system 
that actually discouraged any tinkering with traditional identities.  But it was the Shari’a that made the 
system more flexible. 
 
The Supreme Shari’a Court and Speculative Conversions 
  During the first half of the 1930s, the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a Court (VŠS) took a position 
on speculative conversions that was similar to its position on mixed marriage: it gave precedence to 
state law.  Even though the Hanafi school of the Shari’a stipulates that if a spouse in a non-Muslim 
marriage converts to Islam and the other spouses refuses, the marriage becomes dead, the VŠS insisted 
that it had no jurisdiction in these cases.  The law which the judges cited in justifying this position was 
the 1929 “Law on the organization of Shari’a courts and Shari’a judges,” which stipulated that for a 
marriage to be under the jurisdiction of a Shari’a court either both spouses had to be Muslim or the 
marriage had to be concluded in front of a Shari’a judge (Article 2, clause 1).  This clause empowered 
country’s Shari’a courts to regulate mixed marriages in which the husband was Muslim (for Muslim 
women, mixed marriage was strictly forbidden), but as Fikret Karčić has pointed out, it also precluded 
the Shari’a from extending its reach over non-Muslim marriages in which only one spouse converted 
to Islam.  For a non-Muslim marriage to come under the jurisdiction of the Shari’a, both spouses had 
to convert to Islam.14  The reformist chief justice Abdulah Bušatlić, who was on the bench during the 
first half of the 1930s, argued that state law had to be given precedence in these cases for the sake of 
peace in the multi-religious country, “…it is far more important to maintain religious tolerance 
between citizens of a multi-confessional state such as ours than allow certain individuals to stir up 
religious antagonism and hatred by converting from one faith to another all with the purpose of 
dissolving or entering marriages.”15  The Shari’a scholar Mehmed Begović argued at the time that for 
a Shari’a judge to grant these conversions would have been tantamount to religious propaganda, “A 
                                                     
11 Ibrahim Džananović.  Primjena šerijatskog porodicnog prava kroz praksu Vrhovnog Šerijatskog Suda 1914.-1946.  
(Sarajevo: Fakultet Islamskih Nauka, 2004), 36. 
12 The literature on the gendered nature of nations is simply to vast to summarize here, but the most seminal article is Anne 
McClintock, “ ‘No Longer in a Future Heaven’: Nationalism, Gender and Race,” 260-286.  In Becoming National: A 
Reader.  Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
13 Veena Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India.  (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 
1995): 56 
14 Fikret Karčić, Karčić, Fikret.  Šerijatski sudovi u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941. (Sarajevo: Fakultet Islamskih Nauka, 2005), 68-
69. 
15 Bušatlić, “Nešto o nadležnosti za sklapanje brakova pomuslimanjenih lica,” Mjesečnik br. 1/1923, 24, quoted in Karčić, 
Šerijatski sudovi, 128). 
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Shari’a judge as a state official is not allowed to conduct religious propaganda and proselytize by 
inviting one spouse into Islam even if the other spouse had already converted.”16       
 Thus, when he petitioned the court to convert to Islam, Vjekoslav Palfi stood little chance.  
Nevertheless, he was quite honest in his explanation of why he wanted to become a Muslim: he 
wanted to divorce his wife and marry another woman in order to “save her honor.”  In his handwritten 
letter to the Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo, dated 9 May 1932, this employee of the Yugoslav 
Ministry of Finance admitted that this was not the first time he wanted to change his faith.  He had left 
Catholicism in order to join the “Old-Catholic” church—a relatively liberal denomination that split 
from the Catholic church in 1870 over papal infallibility—for the same practical purpose of divorcing 
his wife who had adamantly refused to grant him a divorce.  However, even the comparably more 
liberal divorce laws of the Old Catholic church required him to provide evidence of adultery, which he 
could not, and refused to grant him a divorce.  His situation seemed to had been more tolerable while 
he was living in Belgrade, separately from his wife, but after moving back to Zagreb he was, “forced 
by pressure from many sides”, to move back in with his wife.  Even while attempting to give his 
intended conversion the appearance of ideological adherence to Islam, Vjekoslav made it clear that his 
newfound love for Islam was mostly strategic and not ideological, 
 
Because I intend to marry a woman whose honor I am duty-bound to save, I studied the books: 
“Nauka Islama [The Doctrine of Islam]” by Muhamed Seid Serdarević, as well as “Der Islam,” 
and “Der islamische Mensch” by Sadr-ud-Din and having become assured of the soundness of the 
doctrine of Islam I have decided to convert to Islam.17 
 
Although it is certainly possible that while reading these books Vjekoslav might have become a 
devout Muslim, it is more likely that his mention of these books was a mere afterthought, designed to 
give his petition a cloak of ideological veracity.  In fact, he never offered an elaboration of his rather 
vague statement that he had become, “assured of the soundness of the doctrine of Islam.”  Instead, in 
the very next sentence Vjekoslav returned to the main reason for his petition, “My current wife 
persistently refuses to grant me a divorce or agree to a support settlement, and thus I cannot get either 
a divorce or any settlement.”  Having been informed by the local Shari’a court that to conclude a 
Muslim marriage he would have to submit either divorce papers or a support settlement, he admitted 
that he could provide neither and plead with the Supreme Shari’a court to excuse him from submitting 
such documents, allow him to convert to Islam, and marry another woman, “in front of any Shari’a 
court in Bosnia.”  The matter was so urgent for Vjekoslav that after a week of not hearing from the 
court he wrote another letter, urging them for a swift solution, and yet another on 24 May 1932, two 
weeks after his initial petition.18  Based on this, one can safely infer that saving the honor of the lady 
with whom he had been involved took precedence over any ideological infatuation with Islam. 
 For its part, the Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo followed the precedent it had established in 
most other cases of divorce-inspired conversions, by refusing to take up the case on jurisdictional 
grounds.  During its deliberations on 17 May, the judges unanimously agreed that the court did not 
have territorial jurisdiction over the case and informed Vjekoslav of its decision not directly, but via 
the Zagreb city government, which was the reason why Vjekoslav had not heard of the decision until 
at least the 24th when he wrote the last letter to the court.19  The court’s refusal to adjudicate 
Vjekoslav’s divorce, or even establish a direct line of communication with him, but instead to involve 
the Zagreb city government, reflected the sensitive nature of the case in a multi-confessional state in 
which conversions, more often than not, triggered conflicts between the confessional communities 
over their “lost” members.  
                                                     
16 Mehmed Begović, Šerijatsko Bračno Pravo: sa Kratkim uvodom izučavanja šerijatskog prava. (Beograd: Izdavačko i 
knjižarsko preduzeće Geca, 1936), 142. 
 
17 VŠS, 1932/21, No. 233, p. 2, ABiH. 
18 VŠS, 1932/21, 2B, 4B 
19 VŠS, 1932/21, 269. 
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 Until 1940, the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court consistently confirmed the decisions of district 
Shari’a courts, in which the latter refused to dissolve non-Muslim marriages and in which one spouse 
had recently converted to Islam, often resisting pressure from the Ulema medžlis for a more active 
stance in granting what the latter saw as a legitimate right of recent converts.  For example, in 1920 a 
woman by the name of Naila Curinaldy petitioned the Sarajevo district Shari’a court to approve her 
divorce from her husband Marin Curinaldy, confirm her conversion to Islam, and allow her to marry a 
Muslim.  Despite the fact that her husband had agreed to a divorce, and that the Ulema medžlis had 
issued a confirmation of this divorce, the district Shari’a court in Sarajevo rejected her petition, citing 
a law issued during the Austro-Hungarian rule in 1883 (Order No. 7220/III, clause 10), which had 
restricted the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts to marriages in which both spouses were Muslim.  In 
rejecting Naila’s appeal and confirming the district court’s original decision, the Supreme Shari’a 
judge Mutapčić wrote that the only way the Shari’a court could have dissolved Naila’s marriage with 
Marin would have been by summoning the spouses to a court hearing, but he warned that state law 
prohibited Shari’a courts from holding hearings for non-Muslims.  The judge reaffirmed the 
precedence of the state over the Shari’a law and noted that the Ulema medžlis had overstepped state 
regulations in issuing the divorce confirmation, 
 
Therefore, in this case, where one litigant is a non-Muslim it is not allowed for either the district 
Shari’a court or the Supreme Shari’a court to apply Shari’a marriage law, and because it did not 
consider that it was limited by state law, the Ulema medžlis issued the aforementioned decision 
[about the validity of Naila’s divorce].20 
 
Given the fact that judge Mutapčić who signed this decision was purged at the onset of King 
Alexander’s dictatorship in 1929, because his loyalty to the regime was seen as questionable21, his 
decision in this case was hardly motivated by his sympathies to the royal regime.  Rather, it reflected 
the professional and legal obligation most Shari’a judges felt they had in strictly limiting the use of the 
Shari’a whenever it could impact the inter-confessional relations in the country.  As they were state—
and not religious officials—Shari’a judges often came into conflict with the Ulema medžlis, as in the 
case of Naila Curinaldy, and with the local clergy, who often viewed the court’s decisions as apathetic 
towards the interests of Islam.  However, judges continued to adhere to state law—at the expense of 
the Shari’a—invoking first, the Austro-Hungarian 1883 law, and later the Yugoslav 1929 “Law on the 
organization of Shari’a courts and Shari’a judges”—in their attempt to minimize potential conflicts 
between the country’s confessional communities over conversions. 
 At times, district Shari’a courts hesitated in restricting the right to divorce to recent converts 
and asked for confirmation from the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court that their rulings had been valid.  
When in 1933, Muhamed Topčija from the village of Mihaljević near Srebrenica petitioned the 
Srebrenica Shari’a court to approve his marriage to Zlata (formerly Roza) Mlakar—who two months 
before had converted to Islam in order to divorce her husband Franjo Kubiček—the lower court 
rejected him, citing both the Shari’a and state law.  The judge referred to the clauses 20 and 132 of 
akhjami-shari’a  according to which Zlata was still considered Franjo’s wife because their marriage 
had still not “died” (utrnuo) and because she had not passed iddet, the three menstruation cycles-long 
period of waiting a divorced woman had to go through before she was eligible for another marriage.  
Second, the Srebrenica judge declared that his court’s competence in this matter had been curtailed by 
Article 2 of the “Law on the organization of Shari’a courts and Shari’a judges.”22  The Sarajevo 
Supreme Shari’a court rejected Muhamed’s appeal to the decision of the lower court, arguing that the 
Shari’a marriage rules still considered Zlata’s marriage to Franjo valid.  However, the opinion of the 
high court also confirmed that, “with her conversion to Islam, she [had] obtained the right to judicially 
dissolve her marriage [to Franjo],”23 but the court did not elaborate as to how she could exercise this 
                                                     
20 VŠS, 225/20, 3 April 1920, p.2, ABiH. 
21 Karčić, 96. 
22 VŠS, 118/33, 1933/33, 8 June 1933. 
23 VŠS, 287/33, 1933/33, 23 June 1933. 
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right, given the fact that the state law prevented Shari’a courts from dissolving or solemnizing 
marriages of non-Muslims.  From a letter the Srebrenica court wrote to the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a 
court some four months after the latter had rejected Muhamed’s appeal, we can infer that Zlata and her 
husband had once again petitioned the lower court to solemnize their marriage.  In the letter, the 
Srebrenica judge asked the Sarajevo court to confirm his opinion that, “in this matter [this court] is 
absolutely incompetent to conduct a hearing and dissolve a marriage between a Muslim convert and a 
non-Muslim…”24  The Srebrenica judge further argued that even though Shari’a marriage rules 
empowered the court to dissolve Zlata’s marriage to Franjo and solemnize her new marriage to 
Muhamed, it was state law that made the possibility of any hearing in this matter “an illusion.”25 
Despite the tone of certainty in his declaration of incompetency, the Srebrenica judge was still 
uncertain whether to give more weight to the Shari’a or the state law, which seemed to be in 
opposition in this case, “even though Shari’a rules allow this [the dissolution of Zlata’s marriage to 
Franjo], state laws, which the district Shari’a court is obligated to follow equally, do not.  This court 
cannot independently decide to which set of laws to give precedence, and which set of laws to apply in 
this matter.”26  In its response, the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court confirmed the Srebrenica judge’s 
opinion that the Shari’a did not have jurisdiction in this matter, and that the judge had been correct in 
giving precedence to state law.27  Thus, in these cases state law stifled the flexibility of the Shari’a 
marriage rules and placed some recent converts in a legal limbo: while officially considered Muslim 
they could not fully exercise some rights—such as to divorce and (re) marry—that they would have 
been entitled to had they been born Muslim.   
 For its part, the Islamic clergy seemed torn between its desire to expand the Muslim 
community by admitting new members, and its efforts to strengthen the religious devotion of its 
members, particularly by weeding out those who converted for pragmatic reasons.  Thus, even though 
it occasionally intervened with Shari’a courts on behalf of recent Muslim converts—as was in the case 
of Naila Curinaldy—by 1939, the Ulema medžlis had become alarmed by the increasing frequency of 
conversions to Islam, many of which had been “speculative,” in the words of an Ulema medžlis 
circular sent to all religious officials on January 11, 1939.  In the circular, the Ulema medžlis warned 
that these types of converts had harmed the Islamic community, 
 
In recent times conversions from other faiths to Islam have become more frequent.  The reasons 
for these conversions have mostly been of speculative nature, for marriage or other material 
reasons.  In many cases, the public behavior of the majority of such converts has proved the main 
reason for their conversion.  In the majority of cases, even after their conversion, these people 
remained what they had always been, the least of which was Muslim.  Because of this the Islamic 
religious community has suffered considerable damage.28 
 
In order to make sure that the Islamic community accept only those who will become true Muslims, 
the circular outlined a more robust conversion procedure, approved by the Reis-ul-ulema a month 
earlier, that was to be supervised by the Ulema medžlis office.  An individual who wanted to become a 
Muslim would approach his local imam and submit his or her marriage status form, as well as the 
confirmation from their priest that they had left their previous faith.  After receiving these documents, 
the local imam was obligated to thoroughly investigate the motive behind the conversion and forward 
all the documents, including his observations regarding the motive of the conversion, to the Ulema 
medžlis office where the final decision would be made.  In the case that the convert was rejected, he or 
she had fourteen days to appeal, but the appeal would be considered by the Ulema medžlis.  By 
centralizing the conversion procedure, the Ulema medžlis strove to tighten its control over the inter-
confessional boundary which, in its eyes, had become too permeable in the recent years. 
                                                     
24 VŠS, 190/33, 1933/33, 26 October 1933. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 VŠS, 449/33, 1933/33, 28 October 1933. 
28VŠS, 9160/38, 120/39, 11 January 1939. 
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 The increasing surveillance of conversions was a part of the more widespread mobilization 
within the Islamic community to combat what was perceived as a serious weakening of the 
community, the main cause of which was the increasing frequency of mixed marriages.  In fact, on the 
same day the Ulema medžlis sent its circular outlining the new procedure on conversions, it also 
instructed all the branches of the Islamic religious community to strictly follow the ban on mixed 
marriage, which the Reis-ul-ulema and his High Council had issued during their session on 21 
December 1938.  While speculative conversions might have weakened the Islamic community, they 
were nothing compared to the damage wreaked on the community by mixed marriages.  According to 
the Ulema medžlis, “It is indisputable that what has contributed the most to the weakening of the 
Islamic religious community are mixed marriages which have multiplied among the Muslims in recent 
years…”29 The most pernicious consequence of such marriages, according to the circular, were 
children who “have become a problem,” since often they were “given up” to their Christian mothers, 
who would baptize them with or without the permission of their Muslim fathers.  Summarizing the 
provisions of the ban on mixed marriage the Reis had adopted, as well as his order to excommunicate 
those Muslims who had solemnized their marriage in a church or in accordance with rituals of another 
faith, the Ulema medžlis instructed the clergy to use their Friday prayers to talk to their congregations 
about the, “bad consequences of every kind of mixed marriage.”30  Immediately upon receiving the 
circular, every imam was to check if there were any Muslims in his region who had concluded their 
marriage in accordance with the rituals of another faith and, if so, he was to summon such men, and in 
a “polite and appropriate manner” inform them of the conclusions of the Reis and his High Council.  
The offending Muslim was then to be given three months to remarry in front of his local Shari’a court, 
but only after either his wife had converted to Islam or he had obtained the permission from the Reis to 
conclude a mixed marriage.  Otherwise, the imam would be required to delete his name from the 
Muslim registry, thus effectively excommunicating him.31  The two circulars of the Ulema medžlis 
echoed two contradictory sentiments: while one warned the clergy to be vigilant against pragmatic 
conversions, the circular on mixed marriage would have made pragmatic conversions of non-Muslim 
women the only alternative mixed marriage spouses had to save their marriage. 
 As it can be seen, in addition to mixed marriage, speculative or pragmatic conversions also 
became a part and parcel of the campaign to buttress Islamic identity in the late 1930s Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Similarly to mixed marriage, during the first half of the decade the issue elicited 
division between the Shari’a judiciary and lower-level clerics over the extent to which the Shari’a 
should submit to the jurisdiction of the state law.  But while the clergy seemed relatively united over 
the need to ban mixed marriage, their sentiments regarding pragmatic conversions were much more 
ambivalent and at times contradictory.  While on the one hand they were enthusiastic in inducting new 
members into the community, and sometimes even intervened for their petitions to be approved, they 
were also forced to acknowledge the pragmatic nature of these conversions and felt these weakened 
the already questionable religious discipline.  What is particularly interesting is that as the Islamic elite 
homogenized during the second half of the 1930s in an attempt to cement the inter-confessional 
boundary, the waning influence of the state law made it easier, not harder, for some individuals to slip 
through this boundary.  
 For example, for Jakub (formerly Janko) Zupančić from Zagreb the eagerness of some Islamic 
officials to grant new converts the right to divorce—even if this meant ignoring state law—meant that 
he was able to dissolve his Catholic marriage and marry an Orthodox woman in accordance with the 
Shari’a.  In 1923, Janko married Paula Rakić in a Catholic church in Banja Luka (Bosnia), but on 24 
May 1937 he converted to Islam, when he took the name Jakub, and almost exactly one month later on 
25 June married Julka Radić in front of the Shari’a court in Zagreb.  His first wife Paula sued him at 
the Zagreb Shari’a court, claiming that his marriage to Julka was invalid, given that their Catholic 
marriage had never been properly dissolved.  In her petition to the Zagreb court, Paula’s lawyer 
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referred to Clause 62 of the “General Civil Code” (Opšti građanski zakonik) which treated an existing 
marriage as an obstacle to a new marriage.  However, in its rejection of Paula’s suit, the Shari’a 
district court in Zagreb noted that, “[f]or marriages solemnized before Shari’a courts, the rules of the 
Shari’a, and not the rules of the General Civil Code, are valid.”32  Acknowledging that in practice 
Shari’a courts had considered an existing marriage to be an obstacle to a new marriage, the Zagreb 
Shari’a court argued that Jakub had proved that he and Paula agreed to dissolve their marriage in front 
of the Sisak (Croatia) court in 1934.  Paula appealed the decision of the Zagreb court at the Sarajevo 
Supreme Court, arguing adamantly that the divorce agreement between her and her husband had never 
happened, 
 
The decision [of the Zagreb court] wrongly states that [Jakub] proved that he was divorced 
because he cannot and does not have any proof of this.  And for a marriage to be concluded in 
accordance with Islam, it is necessary for his first wife to give her husband the approval.  I have 
never given him such approval so he could not have provided the evidence of the same.33   
 
Even though Paula’s interpretation of the Shari’a marriage rules was not quite correct—since the 
Shari’a does allow the husband to marry up to four wives with or without the first wife’s approval—
the precedence Shari’a courts had established in these cases, and the Supreme Shari’a court had 
repeatedly confirmed, suggest that Paula’s petition would have been approved, and Jakub’s marriage 
to Julka would not only have been declared invalid, but would not have been solemnized by a Shari’a 
court in the first place.  Even had Jakub presented the proof of a divorce agreement, we need only 
recall the 1920 case of Naila Curinaldy in which, despite the husband’s agreement to grant her a 
divorce, the Supreme Shari’a judge Mutapčić rejected her petition, arguing that the state law prevented 
the Shari’a court from meddling in the matter.  That the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court would 
confirm Jakub Zupančić’s new marriage—in face of his first wife’s steadfast opposition to it—
reflected the waning influence of the state law on the Shari’a judges.  In rejecting Paula’s suit against 
Jakub and confirming the validity of his Muslim marriage, the Supreme court claimed that as a 
Muslim, Jakub enjoyed the right to have two (and up to four) wives at a time, 
 
Therefore, according to the Shari’a, Jakub Zupančić as a Muslim could, beside his wife Paula 
Rakić, who belongs to the Catholic faith, and without her permission, also marry the second wife 
Julka Sadrić, who belongs to the Orthodox faith, so he currently has two wives.34   
 
State policies, designed to maintain inter-confessional peace in the country, threatened legal sanctions 
against religious officials who transgressed the boundaries of their jurisdiction. 
The court’s decision in the Zupančić case not only broke its own precedence, but it also violated the 
criminal code of Yugoslavia, particularly Article 399, clause 2, which threatened a prison term for, “a 
religious representative who marries an individual who had previously entered a marriage in 
accordance with the rituals of any religion accepted in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia or who had 
previously entered into a civil marriage.”35  While contrary to the state law, the decision was based on 
the directives of the Shari’a court from 1922 (No. 503) and 1924 (No. 211), both of which claimed 
that the Shari’a court had jurisdiction over a non-Muslim marriage in which the husband converted to 
Islam because the Shari’a allowed polygamy.36  However, in 1926, the reformist judge and Shari’a 
scholar Abdulah Bušatlić argued that, even though Shari’a courts might be competent to solemnize 
these marriages, the individual Shari’a judge could still excuse himself from such cases because, “even 
though in certain instances, polygamy is allowed and is not a crime for the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, I believe that such marriages can be denied because this is a very uncomfortable 
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situation and in the cases of mixed marriage, it is up to the individual judge to decide.”37  The fact that 
both, the Zagreb and Sarajevo courts ignored their own precedent, and the state law, revealed the 
growing independence of the Shari’a judiciary from the state’s embrace. 
 That the Sarajevo-based Islamic establishment grew increasingly indifferent to the political 
consequences of pragmatic conversions is illustrated by the case of the conversion of an Orthodox 
priest in September 1940.  If the conversion of an ordinary citizen could stir up animosities between 
the religious communities, the conversion of a priest to Islam could be interpreted as a full frontal 
attack on a community, and could cause an explosive, country-wide scandal with far-reaching 
repercussions.  Thus, when in September 1940, the Orthodox priest Nikola Vuković from the tiny 
Serbian village of Aldinac walked into the office of imam Idris ef. Hajrulah in Skoplje (Macedonia) 
and asked to be accepted into Islam, the imam’s immediate reaction was shock mixed with suspicion.  
Not knowing what to make of the priest’s highly unusual request, the imam wrote a letter to the Reis-
ul-ulema Fehim Spaho and asked for instructions.  Ef. Hajrulah wanted to consult with the Reis before 
making a decision because he wanted to, “make sure that this is not some special mission of the 
priest,” and hoped “to peer deeper into his motives.”  As to the motives of the conversion, in a long 
conversation with the imam, priest Vuković claimed that he had become “embittered” against his 
church, 
 
The reason for this is that, according to him, church authorities have been abusing, punishing, and 
persecuting him, especially by making him eat his meals in a bar [kafana] because his wife died 
and he cannot get married again and he is struggling with his child and cannot bear to stand the 
unjust persecutions [from the church].38 
 
It seems that the only specific grievance the priest had against his church was that, by not allowing 
him to get remarried, it had denied him a chance to have someone cook for him and take care of his 
child.  Nonetheless, the priest was so angry with his church that he asked for no official position 
within Islamic institutions, promised to ask for no financial reward, and asked for his case to be 
published in the paper.  It must have been this last unusual request that prompted the imam to confess 
to the Reis that “I do not dare to act before receiving your highly respected opinion.”39 Reis’ terse and 
resolute response, however, contrasted with the hesitant and shocked tone of the imam’s letter, “In the 
matter of the petition of priest Nikola Vuković for his conversion to Islam, I find that there is 
absolutely no obstacle for the approval of his petition, and it is my opinion that this should be done.”40 
 Seen in conjunction with the decision of the Supreme Shari’a court in the Zupančić case, some 
three months later, Reis’ lack of hesitancy in accepting the priest into the Islamic fold reflected the 
increasing tendency of the Sarajevo-based Islamic establishment to focus strictly on the letter of the 
Shari’a, without taking into consideration the effects this would have on the inter-confessional 
relations in the country.  Thus, in the midst of the efforts of the Islamic establishment to tighten the 
inter-confessional boundary, the growing gap between the state and mosque, and the inclinations of 
the Shari’a judiciary towards the letter, occasionally made pragmatic transgressions of the boundary 
more desirable, (as new converts obtained the right to remarry), and more easy, (as potentially 
explosive conversions were approved). 
 
I have “cleansed myself from Islam,” the Conversions of Women  
If the clergy were ambivalent towards conversion of men they were particularly suspicious, and even 
hostile, to conversions of women, a sentiment they shared with secular authorities.  In particular, 
women, who through their conversion to Islam crossed the boundaries of citizenship, could quickly 
become objects of police scrutiny.  For example, on 15 August 1921, the Regional Ministry of Interior 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina responded to a police inquiry from the Bosnian town of Vlasenica in which the 
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police had informed the headquarters about the recent arrival from Russia of two (Bosnian) Muslim 
men, along with their Russian wives who had recently converted to Islam and obtained Yugoslav 
citizenship.  Because their Yugoslav citizenship prevented the authorities from exiling the women, the 
official from the Ministry of Interior Nikolić instructed the local authorities to, “place [the women] 
under the most discreet surveillance and monitor their actions and movements”41, in uncovering their 
potential anti-state activities.  Nikolić warned his subordinates not to hesitate in punishing the women 
if it turned out they were working against the state, “In case their anti-state activities are proved, the 
most severe legal action is to be pursued against them, like it would be against anyone else, and which 
is stipulated by the most recent law on the protection of public order and the state.”42 The suspicion of 
foreign women who obtained Yugoslav citizenship through intermarriage became particularly intense 
after Hitler’s annexation of Austria in March 1938, when the country’s main newspapers published 
stories of wealthy, Viennese Jewish women marrying naïve, poor Muslim men only to save their lives 
and property.  Symbols of the foreign body politic, women often became the means through which the 
press, the public, religious, and state officials communicated their own anxieties about the stability of 
the Yugoslav state. 
 While the scorn against foreign women who (pragmatically) obtained Yugoslav citizenship 
was particularly vociferous, Yugoslav women who dared cross the inter-confessional boundary were 
often the subjects of equally intense scrutiny by an alliance between secular and religious authorities.  
As the inter-confessional boundary cemented in December 1938, with Reis Spaho’s ban on mixed 
marriage, conversion to Islam became the only option for non-Muslim women who wanted to marry 
Muslim men.  However, their conversions became vulnerable to the suspicions of secular authorities, 
rumors from the local community, and to the increasing determination of Islamic authorities to guard 
the entrance into the Muslim community.  Thus, when in 1939, Vida Stojović from the eastern 
Bosnian village of Rogatica attempted to marry Zaim Zulejkić by converting to Islam, both the 
religious and secular authorities joined forces in thwarting their plans in order to protect Zaim from, 
“an immoral woman who was given to prostitution and other vice.”43  This is how the chief of the 
local police described Vida in his letter to the district Shari’a court in Podgorica (Montenegro), where 
Zaim’s petition to be married was currently being considered.  After receiving the petition, the 
Rogatica Shari’a court had forwarded the request to the Podgorica court asking for a murasela, an 
authorization to solemnize the marriage.  In the letter, the police chief informed the Podgorica court 
that Zaim, a peasant shoe-maker (opančar), was already married with five children and would be 
ruined if he married Vida, a waitress who had reportedly prostituted herself while working at local 
cafes.  In fact, her reputation was so damaging to the community that the police had exiled her to her 
place of birth in Montenegro, and it was during her exile that she converted to Islam.  The police chief 
urged the Podgorica court to prevent her from marrying Zaim, insisting that the citizens of Rogatica 
shared his concerns, 
 
The citizens who know Vida as an immoral woman given to prostitution and vice  cannot stand her 
behavior, so many respectable Muslims beg of you to prevent this marriage because it is well 
known that Vida did not convert to Islam because of her beliefs but out of purely speculative 
reasons so that she could marry Zulejkić and with her immoral life destroy him, his property, his 
wife and his five children.44 
 
It seems that the letter of the Rogatica chief of police achieved the desired effect because on 1 April 
1939, the Podgorica Shari’a court refused to issue a murasela because Vida was, “an extremely 
immoral woman, given to prostitution and other vices, and her conversion to Islam was done only for 
speculative reasons, and because the imam in Nikšić who converted her to Islam did not have 
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territorial jurisdiction to do so.”45  Informing the Supreme Shari’a court of this case, the Rogatica court 
noted that both Zaim and Vida had been informed in person of the final decision and that the case had 
been closed.46  
 As the increased surveillance of the inter-confessional boundary resulted in longer waiting 
periods for potential converts, intervention by men who were familiar with the Reis-ul-ulema could 
sometimes speed up women’s petitions.  This was the case with Mujaga Jasarević from Banja Luka 
who, on 3 August 1939, pleaded with Reis Spaho to intervene with the Sarajevo Ulema medžlis and 
approve the conversion to Islam of his future daughter-in-law.  His son had become involved with a 
Catholic woman by the name of Marija Jesenak and she had had his child, but they had still not been 
able to marry.  In desperation, Marija had petitioned the Sarajevo Ulema medžlis to be allowed to 
convert to Islam and marry his son, but two months had passed and they had not heard from the 
authorities.  Worrying that his son might convert to Catholicism instead, Mujaga pleaded with the 
Reis, “I think you will understand the position I am in and that you will get involved if not for them 
then at least for me because I’d rather see him dead than for him to convert to Catholicism.”47  Even 
though it was obvious that the conversion was purely strategic, the Reis intervened the very same day 
with the Ulema medžlis and wrote to Mujaga that “the matter will be resolved today.”48  Possibly 
concerned with “losing” Mujaga’s son to Catholicism, the Reis acted with great urgency in intervening 
with the clergy establishment to approve Marija’s conversion petition.    
 Although the flexible Shari’a marriage laws could encourage conversions of men to Islam, for 
Muslim women trapped in unbearable marriages, conversion out of Islam often remained the only 
option.  This was largely due to the divorce provision of the Hanafi school, which allowed for a 
marriage to be dissolved only with the consent of the husband (unless he is mentally ill, impotent, or 
unable to support a wife).49  The issue of divorce in the Shari’a and in particular the practice of 
talaq—a husband-initiated dissolution of marriage which he could achieve simply by repeating three 
times his intent to divorce his wife—had been a cause for many Islamic reformers. Considering the 
practice outdated, prone to manipulation, and damaging to the Muslim family, the famous Egyptian 
reformer and the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Muhammad Abduh, campaigned against the talaq and 
advocated for the right of divorce to be extended to women.50  Muhammad Abduh’s argument was 
later picked by the Sarajevo Shari’a judge Abdulah Bušatlić who, during his tenure as the chief of the 
Supreme Court, urged the Ulema medžlis to help women dissolve unbearable marriages by using the 
precedence of other Shari’a schools, which, “are more appropriate in the particular circumstance and 
the spirit of the time.”51  However, the resurgence of the conservatives within the Shari’a courts during 
the second half of the 1930s meant the abandonment of reforms.  Consequently, the practice of talaq 
continued relatively unimpeded, with some corrupt judges granting instant divorces to husbands, 
leaving women without any means of support.52  The Shari’a scholar Ibrahim Džananović has pointed 
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out that despite the existence of other more liberal approaches to the issue, the Shari’a institutions in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina stuck with the practice, causing “many Muslim women to commit apostasy.”53 
 One such woman was Ajiša Šahinagić of Sarajevo who converted out of Islam in order to 
divorce her husband Ismetaga.  After unsuccessfully trying to divorce Ismetaga for seven years, on 28 
May 1934 Ajiša sent a note to the Sarajevo district Shari’a court in which she declared that she no 
longer felt herself to be Muslim and demanded that the court annul her marriage to Ismetaga.  In 
accordance with the Shari’a rule (Article 303 of akhjami sharia), which states that a marriage in which 
one of the spouses converts out of Islam becomes “dead” (utrnut) at the moment of the conversion, the 
local Sarajevo court issued a confirmation of her conversion and the annulment of her marriage that 
same day.  Rather than bringing Ajiša’s seven-year struggle to an end, however, the court’s decision 
triggered a two-year court battle during which Ismetaga contested Ajiša’s right to divorce him, even at 
one point demanding that the court order the police to arrest her, force her to convert back to Islam, 
and bring her back to him. Ismetaga won his first appeal against the decision of the lower court, and 
the Supreme Shari’a Court instructed the lower court to hold a proper hearing at which Ajiša would be 
summoned and asked to confirm her intent to convert.  At the hearing on 1 November 1934, almost six 
months after she had decided to convert, Ajiša once again expressed her determination to leave the 
faith.  In the words of a Sarajevo district Shari’a judge, 
 
At the hearing held on 1 November 1934 and in accordance with the aforementioned decision of 
the Supreme Shari’a court [in which the high court ordered the hearing] the petitioner personally 
confirmed what she had previously said in her written statement, that she left Islam because it is 
not right for a husband to have the right to talaq, but the Shari’a does not grant the same right to a 
woman, so she no longer has anything to do with Islam, that she has cleansed herself from Islam, 
that is, she left Islam.54 
 
Ajiša’s decision to convert was thus more than simply strategic, as it was also the result of her 
disillusionment with Islam due to what she perceived as the Shari’a’s  unfair treatment of women.  In 
fact, if one is to take the stenographic record to be accurate, Ajiša’s statement that she had, “cleansed 
herself from Islam,” hints at her disgust with the religion.  Her seven-year struggle to end her marriage 
led her to view her faith as a dirty substance that had to be washed off her body.  Unlike Vjekoslav 
Palfi’s conversion to Islam, which seemed purely strategic,  Ajiša Šahinagić’s conversion out of Islam, 
besides being strategic, was also an emotional rejection of her faith.   
 Rather than seeing her conversion as voluntary, her husband and the Supreme Shari’a court 
interpreted it as an impulsive act, one she had concocted at someone else’s urging.  The husband 
challenged the court’s jurisdiction in the matter, arguing that since the state law prevented the Shari’a 
court from imposing the punishment the Shari’a prescribed for apostasy, such as lashing and a prison 
sentence, it also prevented the court from dissolving the marriage.  Second, he contested Ajiša’s 
agency in this matter by insisting that she was still a Muslim, regardless of her intent to convert.55  
Finally, he insisted that her conversion was a culmination of her furious court battle to divorce 
Ismetaga, 
 
…it is notoriously known…that for the past 7 years the litigant has pursued different lawsuits 
against Ismetaga only with the purpose of dissolving her marriage to him and after she had failed 
to achieve this, she obtained the declaration of her conversion out of Islam, so it is clear that her 
action is purely formal…56   
 
In her response, Ajiša’s lawyer insisted that her apostasy had not been impulsive, “…she issued her 
statement of intent [to convert] not out of excitement or anger, which is confirmed by the fact that she 
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said today what she had first said 5 months ago, so she had clearheadedly thought about it…”57  In 
rejecting Ismetaga’s appeal and confirming Ajiša’s apostasy and the annulment of her marriage, the 
district Shari’a court in Sarajevo defended its jurisdiction in this matter, acknowledging that while the 
state had taken away the right of the Shari’a to punish apostasy, it had still granted it the jurisdiction 
over Muslim marriage.  The court also insisted that since Ajiša had converted “in front of a witness 
[na oči], while in a full possession of her faculties [pri svijesti], and without coercion,”58 it did not 
matter if her real motivation had been purely pragmatic.  Even though this conclusion suggested 
Ajiša’s act had been clearheaded, the court suggested that it was also an act of desperation, for which 
it blamed the husband, 
 
The husband’s statement that the litigant has for 7 full years pursued different lawsuits in order to 
free herself from this marriage and only when this failed, she did this, in accordance with 
someone’s bad advice, does not speak well for the husband because it could be suggested that it 
was these lawsuits that have led the litigant to commit such an infamous act.59 
 
Thus, even though Ajiša converted, “while in a full possession of her faculties,” “without coercion,” 
and had for five months been declaring her desire to leave Islam, the court still considered the 
conversion an act of a desperate woman, which had been concocted on someone else’s (bad) advice.  
While it is certainly possible, if not probable, that Ajiša had been given the idea to convert out of 
Islam by someone knowledgeable about the Shari’a, it is curious that the court did not even question 
the assumption that Ajiša could have done so out of her own desire to leave Islam. 
 While he had previously questioned the jurisdiction of the Shari’a courts in this matter, in his 
final appeal to the Supreme Shari’a court, Ismetaga demanded that the Shari’a authorities arrest Ajiša, 
whom he still considered to be his lawful wife, force her to convert to Islam, and to marry him again, 
but this time with a minimum amount of financial support (mehr).  Rejecting his appeal, the Supreme 
court argued that since Islam was not a state religion, but one among many in a multi-confessional 
state, the Shari’a authorities could not arrest Ajiša let alone force her to convert back to Islam or 
remarry Ismetaga.  But, “even if the husband’s wish was to be carried out and the fugitive [bjegunica] 
forced to come back to his home, she would be placed in such a hopeless and desperate situation that 
one fears could make her commit yet another rash act, but this time with graver consequences [teže 
naravi].”60  Thus, even though the final decision confirmed Ajiša’s conversion out of Islam and the 
annulment of her marriage to Ismetaga, the court still presented her as an impulsive individual who, if 
forced back into her marriage, could even commit suicide. The court ignored the deliberate nature of 
Ajiša’s actions—reflected in the fact that she reconfirmed her desire to convert five months after her 
initial conversion—and silenced the possibility that Ajiša was leaving Islam not just because she 
wanted to divorce Ismetaga, but also because she had become disillusioned with Islam due to what she 
saw as its discriminatory attitude towards women. 
  While for Ajiša and other Muslim women apostasy remained a way out of a marriage, for 
non-Muslim women married to Muslim men, neither the state nor the Shari’a left any path by which to 
leave an unbearable marriage, even in cases of adultery and domestic abuse. For Blanka Mešanović 
from Sarajevo conversion was not a possible route out of her marriage with Alija Mešanović, so she 
left her husband without officially divorcing him and then later sued him at the district Sarajevo 
Shari’a court for failing to support her financially.  At the hearing, held on 27 December 1938, Blanka 
insisted that she had been forced to leave her husband because he had been beating her, an accusation 
she supported by offering three witnesses, Marica Kebeljić, a lawyer by the name of Dr. Atijas Zekić 
and the Shari’a judge effendi Osman Omerhodžić.  However, she expressed her willingness “to return 
to her husband under the condition that he secure a decent apartment, support her financially, treat her 
respectfully and nicely, and kick out his unlawful wife Esma Gackić with whom he had been living in 
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concubinage.”61  The husband strenuously denied that he had ever beaten her, accused her of leaving 
him without a reason, and forcing him to find another woman to take care of him.  Answering the 
husband’s argument that, “had there been any terror [in the house] she would have left him 
immediately,” Blanka claimed that she had to wait for him to leave because she “was all bloody,” and 
once again offered her witnesses.62  However, in a move that reflected the legal discrimination non-
Muslims faced in Shari’a courts, the judges refused to allow the non-Muslim witnesses to testify 
against a Muslim, making the Shari’a judge Osman Omerhodžić the only witness.  Omerhodžić, 
however, could not confirm that Alija had ever beaten Blanka.  He remembered trying to mediate 
between the two after Blanka had become upset over a letter Alija had received from another woman, 
but could not recall that Alija “had ever in front of him admitted that he had beaten her.”63  Not having 
been able to prove the accusation of physical abuse, the Sarajevo court rejected Blanka’s petition for 
financial support and ruled that, “she is obligated to return to her husband and continue living in a 
marriage with him, and he is obligated to receive her, treat her respectfully, [and] support her 
financially…”64 Although the court threatened him with “legal sanctions” in case he abused her, it is 
hard to see how Blanka could ever prove that he abused her unless the abuse happened in front of a 
Muslim who would be willing to testify.  In the end, Blanka was ordered to pay the full sum of court 
costs, totaling 1518 dinars.  Thus, unlike Ajiša Šahinagić, who could leave her marriage by converting 
out of Islam, Blanka faced the impenetrable obstacle in both the discriminatory judicial practice of the 
Shari’a, and also in the inability of the state law to create a mechanism through which the impact of 
this discrimination could have been cushioned.  Instead, faced with the obligatory jurisdiction of the 
Shari’a over her mixed marriage, and poorer for 1518 dinars, Blanka was forced to return to her 
reportedly abusive, adulterous husband. 
 
Conversions during World War II 
There is no doubt that the Islamic establishment in Sarajevo greeted Hitler’s partition of Yugoslavia 
and Bosnia’s annexation by the Nazi-backed Independent State of Croatia (NDH) with enthusiasm.  
Immediately after the annexation in April 1941, the Führer of the NDH, the fanatically anti-Serbian 
Ante Pavelić branded the Bosnian Muslims, “a flower of the Croatian nation,” appointing the head of 
the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) Džafer Kulenović as his Vice-President. Pavelić’s main 
ideological emissary in Bosnia was Hakija Hadžić, a well known Muslim politician of pro-Croat 
orientation, whose anti-Semitic and anti-Serbian views rivaled only those of Pavelić.  In addition, 
many Muslims enthusiastically joined the Ustaša ranks and many committed vicious atrocities against 
Serb civilians, particularly in eastern Bosnia, inviting reprisals from the recently organized Serb 
resistance forces collectively known as the Četniks.  But, as the historiography of the Second World 
War in Yugoslavia has shown, the relations between the Muslim leadership and the NDH quickly 
soured over the Ustaša atrocities of civilians, the curtailing of Bosnian autonomy, and what the Islamic 
establishment saw as the regime’s preferential treatment of Catholicism over Islam.65 
 The establishment of the NDH, and the spread of unimaginable violence directed against the 
Serbs and the Jews, triggered a flood of conversions—as terrified people struggled to save their 
lives—thanks to the regime’s open policy of forcible conversions to Catholicism. The historian of 
Zagreb, Zlatko Hasanbegović, has pointed out that while during the entire interwar period there had 
been only seventeen conversions of Orthodox Serbs to Islam, during the first few months of the NDH 
there were thirty-one conversions to Islam.66  The Catholic Church, led by the Archbishop Alojzije 
Stepinac, conducted a well publicized campaign of forcible conversions of Serbs to Catholicism, an 
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effort that would cost the Archbishop a hefty prison sentence under the Communists.67  These 
continued until the summer of 1942, when the NDH regime created the farcical Croatian Orthodox 
Church, effectively ending conversions.  In the first few years after the war, the Communist regime 
demanded that all Catholic and Islamic institutions submit detailed lists of all those who converted to 
either Catholicism or Islam during the war, so that these could be annulled.  In this the regime 
encountered stiff resistance from the Catholic church officials in Bosnia, and in particular the Mostar 
bishop Josip Čule, who claimed simultaneously that their parish had never converted anyone during 
the war, and that all the records had been destroyed.  Nevertheless, after months of often threatening 
correspondence the lists began to trickle in from across all of Bosnia, showing a total of 5145 
conversions of Serbs and some Jews.68  Of course, the list was far from complete as some parishes still 
failed to submit their lists, some had been destroyed, many conversions had never been recorded, 
while some were destroyed after the converts had been murdered. 
 It is clear that the Sarajevo Ulema medžlis approved conversions to Islam, and Reis-ul-ulema 
Fehim Spaho intervened on behalf of recent converts with the NDH authorities to save their lives.  By 
September 1942, these conversions had become so alarming for the Travnik Shari’a judge Abdulah 
Škaljić that he was prompted to write a letter to the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a Court, asking that these 
no longer be approved.  In fact, because these converts had, “put shame not only on individuals but 
Muslims in general,” the judge suggested that the authorities create a “black book” with the names of 
those who could potentially ask to be converted.  However, in a terse response, the chief justice 
Mujagić noted that, “nothing should be done regarding this matter given the situation in our 
country.”69  After receiving reports that Jews and Serbs who had converted to Islam were still being 
taken to concentration camps, Reis-ul-ulema Spaho wrote to Vice President Kulenović complaining 
that, “there has been a different treatment of those Greek-Orthodox and Jews which have left their 
faith and converted to Islam, as the change of faith has not in the least improved their personal 
position or their position vis-à-vis the state.”70  He outlined the cases of some Serbs who had been 
murdered, despite having converted to Islam, and pointed out that in some places, the Jews who had 
converted to Catholicism had been allowed to take off the Star of David, while the same privilege had 
not been granted to those who converted to Islam.  The accusations of differential treatment of those 
who converted to Islam from those who had converted to Catholicism, soon became bound up with 
Muslim fears of Catholic proselytism, as news spread that Bosnian Muslim children who were living 
in refugee camps in Croatia had been baptized.71  Once it became clear that Jews could no longer be 
saved by converting to either Islam or Catholicism, Spaho continued to intervene on behalf of Serb 
converts.  In a letter to a friend, he professed helplessness in saving the Jews, “because in the last few 
days the Germans have taken all the Jews from Sarajevo regardless of whether they had converted to 
Islam or Catholicism.  The Germans are doing this and there is no point in intervening with our 
authorities.”  He still held out hope, however, that Serb converts could be saved, pointing out that at 
his intervention Kulenović had issued a circular ordering an equal treatment of all converts.72  That the 
discriminatory treatment against Muslim converts did not stop, however, became clear in a letter Reis 
Spaho wrote to a friend in the Ministry of Faiths later that year, complaining that in the Bosnian town 
of Velika Kladuša all conversions to Islam had been annulled by the local authorities.73  Despite 
government’s promises that these incidents would be remedied, the practice continued contributing to 
the growing gulf between the Sarajevo Muslim establishment and NDH authorities.   
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 In addition to the dispute over conversions, the news of indiscriminate and brutal Ustaša 
violence against civilians led to the eventual disillusionment of the Muslim elites with the NDH 
regime.  On 12 October 1941, a Memorandum issued by a group of leading Muslim intellectuals and 
clerics, including the respected conservative cleric and the founder of the El-Hidaje journal Mehmed 
Handžić, called on, “all Muslims to act in the spirit of high-minded directions of their faith Islam and 
in the interests of the state and stay away from all crimes.”  The petitioners expressed regret for the 
violence that had been visited upon the country’s innocent civilians and, as if to pre-empt accusations 
of Muslim participation in these crimes, pointed out that some Ustaša units had worn fezes during their 
rampage in order to provoke Serb reprisals.  The memorandum also accused Catholic priests of 
fomenting hatred against Islam, “despite all kinds of statements from highest ranks which speak of 
equality of both faiths.”  Finally, they outlined seven demands the NDH government had to fulfill in 
order to create a safer environment, including, “to ensure the safety of life, honor, property and faith 
for all citizens in the state without any discrimination.”  In addition, they requested that the state 
authorities prevent any further actions that might incite inter-ethnic or inter-religious reprisals, and 
demanded that all of those who committed crimes be punished, and that help must be provided to 
those in need.74  The Memorandum may have fallen on deaf ears because two months later, the 
prominent Muslim representatives sent a letter to Vice President Kulenović in which they insisted that 
the NDH-sponsored violence had become intolerable, 
 
Killings of priests and other prominent citizens without trials or convictions, executions by firing 
squad and torture of masses of completely innocent people, evictions of entire families from their 
homes…and their deportation to unknown destinations, expropriation of their property, destruction 
of their places of worship…forcible conversions to Catholicism, all of these are facts which have 
shocked every decent human being and have appalled us, the Muslims of this region.75 
 
The petitioners complained that “one part of the Catholic clergy considers this to be their moment, and 
they are exploiting it so unscrupulously that one is reminded of the Spanish Inquisition.”  Not only had 
many Orthodox citizens been forcibly converted to Catholicism, but converts to Islam had not been 
treated with respect, despite official NDH proclamations about the equality of Catholicism and Islam. 
Moreover, the Muslims of the Bosnian town of Banja Luka—where the Vice President of NDH had 
moved his residence a few months earlier—were appalled at the murder of the town’s famous imam 
Edhem Hodžić, who had been murdered in the middle of the hospital yard, in daylight, by Ustaša 
Josip Babić.  Signaling the rising popularity of Communist Partisans among the Muslims, the 
petitioners complained that the Muslims were being unjustly persecuted by the regime for their pro-
Communist sympathies.  They implored the Vice President to use his position to stop the killings, 
insisting that, “had we wanted to kill, persecute and cleanse the Serbs and others we could have done 
so much more easily hundreds of years ago, when we had much more power than today and when 
those actions could have been more easily justified than they could be today.”76  The Memorandum 
and the letter signaled an irrevocable split between the Bosnian Islamic establishment and the NDH 
regime. 
 As the historiography of World War II in Yugoslavia has shown, the continuing violence of 
the NDH against civilians, the growing evidence of Pavelić’s cynical exploitation of Islam for political 
purposes, fears about the proselytizing activities of the regime-backed Catholic church, led many 
Muslims to join the Partisan ranks, and Reis Spaho to publicly distance himself from the regime.77  For 
example, in October and November 1941, as the Muslim intellectuals were writing protest letters to 
the government, Spaho refused to write contributions for the main Ustaša publications, complaining 
that he simply had no time.  In addition, Spaho continued to intervene for both Muslims and non-
Muslims, in trying to protect them from the murderous regime.  Thus, in a letter dated 20 September 
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1941 he wrote to the NDH Minister of Education, Mile Budak, asking that two teachers, a mixed 
marriage couple, be moved back to Sarajevo, after they had been transferred to a small, purely Serb 
village.  Even though the husband, a Muslim, had for a time worked for a pro-Serb organization before 
the war, Spaho assured Budak that he was not sympathetic to the Serbs.  In this case, Spaho used the 
wife’s Catholicism as a bargaining chip, reminding Budak that the man was in a mixed marriage.78  
Even though Budak politely replied, it is highly improbable that the Reis’ intervention helped the 
couple.  Nonetheless, Spaho would intervene repeatedly also on behalf of non-Muslims, including a 
Serb woman by the name of Mara Radić who had been summarily fired from her job as a teacher even 
though, according to Spaho, “she has never been in conflict with any Catholics or Muslims.”  He 
begged Budak to either give her the job back, or to ensure that she received a pension.  An official 
from the Ministry later wrote to Spaho, letting him know that Mara had been kept in her position and 
that this was the only such case.79 
 The ambivalent position of the Sarajevo Muslim establishment vis-à-vis the NDH regime may 
have saved it from the same policy the Communists adopted towards the Catholic church after the war, 
considering the latter as having been unequivocally supportive of the Ustaša regime.  Thus, following 
the war, the Islamic establishment was generally supportive of the Communist efforts to secularize 
marriage, to ban the full veiling of women, and to promote the doctrine of “brotherhood and unity.”  
The same, however, could not be said for the Catholic Church hierarchy, as is evident in the well-
publicized trial of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, in Tito’s strained relations with the Vatican, and in 
the persecution of Herzegovina Franciscans, who struggled to reconcile themselves to the Communist 
victory. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the confessional segregation of interwar Yugoslavia, which was enshrined in its very 
Constitution, and the heavy costs associated with trespassing confessional boundaries, Yugoslavs 
converted in socially significant numbers throughout this period.  That they proved willing to change 
their official identity for marriage purposes, seems to run counter to Fredrik Barth’s observation that 
adoption of different identities happens only, “because [the previous identity] is consistently 
unrewarding to act upon.”80 The examples Barth and other structuralist sociologists provide entail 
much more significant changes in individual lifestyles, but it cannot be denied that the conversions 
discussed above were often very costly for the individuals involved.  This was particularly the case for 
women converts, who could find themselves objects of police surveillance or exposed to lengthy court 
proceedings. Of course, as Barth reminds us, the occasional “osmosis of personnel” between 
confessional categories did not lead to a flood or to the erasure of these identities.  If anything, it made 
them even more socially salient.81  But it is precisely the marginal status of these conversions that 
made them the object of frantic attempts by both secular and religious authorities, to police them. 
 Besides revealing the pragmatic nature of individuals at times of inter-ethnic polarization—the 
trait that has been amply documented by the literature on national indifference in Europe—these 
conversions also reveal an interesting interaction between the Shari’a and Yugoslav state law.  
Contrary to the widespread alarmist view of the Shari’a as static and inflexible,82 in the case of 
Yugoslavia it was the Shari’a that enabled many individuals to game an opaque secular legal system.  
Although the literature on the Shari’a has documented many examples where Shari’a judiciaries 
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proved not only agile in responding to social problems, but also pro-active in enacting reforms83, the 
historiography of interwar Yugoslavia has largely passed on the opportunity to do so.  Finally, the 
preceding story also shows that a country that was purportedly based on integralist efforts to create an 
overarching and multi-confessional Yugoslav nation, was saddled with a clumsy and unwieldy legal 
system, which made movement between official categories all but impossible.  Therein may lie 
another explanation for the failure of the Yugoslav project. 
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